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 “When a dish in short supply is shared at a polite dinner party, there is seldom any verbal dispute. 
If things go well, the dish gets divided without any verbal dispute. If things go well, the dish gets 
divided without any discussion or intervention by the host. When questioned, everybody will agree 
that each person should take his fair share (...) What is judged to be fair according to our current 
standards of morality depends on a complex combination of contingent circumstances – such as 
who is fat and who dislikes cheese. Moreover, if we observe what actually happens, rather than 
what people say should happen, we will find that it also depends on how each person at the table 
fits into the social pecking order. Woe betide the poor relative sitting at the table on sufferance in 
the last century who helped himself to an over-generous portion of his favourite dish” 
Binmore	(1998,	p.	275)
INTRODUCTION
Economists have long believed that the central objectives of economics have been to solve 
issues of scarcity and efficiency, through the analysis of how society makes choices concerning 
the use of its limited resources (Stiglitz 1988). To achieve these goals economists have relied 
on the traditional homo economicus model, where through the pursuit of their own self interest 
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individuals will achieve utility and efficiency maximization of the resources available. While 
this theory holds in many situations, recent evidence shows that individuals do not always make 


















































































































Question 1:  At a sightseeing point reachable only on foot a well has been tapped. The bottled water 
is sold from a private supplier to thirsty hikers. The price is 1 CHF (Swiss Franc) per 
bottle. Daily production, and thus the stock, is 100 bottles. On a particularly hot day 200 
hikers want to buy a bottle. As a consequence the supplier raises the price to 2 CHF per 






announcement	of	a	price	rise	for	their	services	often	causes	strong	opposition1.	From	this	dAVid A. sAVAgE And bEnno torglEr 
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question	the	following	hypothesis	can	be	formulated:
Hypothesis 1: Students judge the price adaptation from 1 CHF to 2 CHF to be more unfair, if made by 
the local authorities instead of a private supplier. 
Question 2:  At a sightseeing point reachable only on foot a well has been tapped. The bottled water 
is sold from local authorities to thirsty hikers. The price is 1 CHF (Swiss Franc) per 
bottle. Daily production, and thus the stock, is 100 bottles. On a particularly hot day 200 
hikers want to buy a bottle. As a consequence the supplier raises the price to 2 CHF per 












Hypothesis 2: Students sense the price system as fairer when the revenue is handed over to a charitable 
institution.
Question 3:  Suppose the well owner would hand over the surplus revenue from the price increase to 




















fee	or	charges	and	have	historically	punished	politicians	for	doing	so.PErcEPtions of fAirnEss And AllocAtion systEms
234
Hypothesis 3:	In emergency situation, students evaluate the price adaptation from 1 CHF to 2 CHF in 
an urgent situation as more unfair compared to a normal situation.	
Question 4:  On a particularly hot day, some people have a heat stroke. The private seller raises 
the price to 2 CHF per bottle of water. Do you find the price more acceptable, equally 





Hypothesis 4: The better a hiker is informed about a possible excess demand situation, the better he/
she can build expectations and the higher the evaluated fairness of a price system. 
Question 5:  At the beginning of the footpath the hikers are informed, that the demand for water 
sometimes exceeds the daily stock. Do you consider the price increase to 2 CHF by the 







Hypothesis 5: The price increase for the more expensive beverage is considered to be fairer because 
hikers have the possibility to choose the other beverage.
Question 6:  Consider the following situation: The supplier at the sight-seeing point offers a more 
expensive beverage at 5 CHF per bottle. On a particularly hot day the price of this 
more expensive beverage is raised to 8 CHF. Do you consider this price rise to be more 






Hypothesis 6: The introduction of an additional supplier has the consequence that the price increase 
for bottles of water by the first supplier is considered to be fairer because the hiker can 
easily switch to the other supplier.
Question 7:  We have now a situation in which another supplier located near the sight-seeing point 
also offers water, but at a price of 1 CHF per bottle. Do you consider the price increase to 
2 CHF by the supplier at the sight-seeing point to be more acceptable, equally acceptable 


















































































































  Allocation via Price 
System by a Private 
Supplier
Allocation via 
Price System by the 
Government
Surplus Revenue 
Distribution to the Red 
Cross
Unfair 19.4% 46.2% 7.5%
Acceptable 53.8% 40.9% 43%
Fair 26.9% 12.9% 49.5%






















































Dependent Variables Fairness Allocation via Price System by 
a Private Supplier
Acceptability Compared to 





to the Red 
Cross
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent	Variables:
Female -0.651** -0.664** -0.726** -0.012 -0.045 0.396
	 z-value -2.44 -2.41 -2.41 -0.17 -0.13 1.01
	 marg.	effect 0.273 -0.201 -0.210 -0.012 -0.009 0.149
Fiscal	Exchange -0.394** -0.337* 0.072* 0.332*
	 z-value -2.06 -1.79 1.83 1.71
	 marg.	effect -0.135 -0.112 0.072 0.069
Age	24	to	44 -0.435 0.186 -0.546*
	 z-value -1.45 0.61 -1.92
	 marg.	effect -0.134 0.041 -0.215
Economics	Major 0.230 -5.160***
	 z-value 0.62 -22.12
	 marg.	effect 0.043 -0.539
Working	Part-Time -0.320 0.132 0.263
	 z-value -1.09 0.43 0.81




N 89 83 82 83 82 83




Hot Day with  
Heat Stroke
Information to the 
Subjects
Price Increase of a 
further Beverage
Competition
Less	acceptable 63.4% 5.4% 12.9% 8.6%
Equally	acceptable 34.4% 30.1% 49.5% 50.5%
More	acceptable 1.1% 63.4% 37.6% 39.8%
No	response 1.1% 1.1% 0% 1.1%PErcEPtions of fAirnEss And AllocAtion systEms
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is fairer than (%) First Come, 




First	Come,	First	Serve - 45	i 56 56 71
Price	System - 58 57 67
























Dependent Variable Fairest Solution:
Weak People First
  (7) (8)
Independent	Variables:
Female 0.814** 0.813**
	 z-value 2.29 2.28
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